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Abstract—Current Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
technology is not suited to be widely deployed inside a 
Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
environment. Anomaly- and signature-based IDS 
technologies have developed methods to cover information 
technology-based networks activity and protocols 
effectively. However, these IDS technologies do not include 
the fine protocol granularity required to ensure network 
security inside an environment with weak protocols lacking 
authentication and encryption. By implementing a more 
specific and more intelligent packet inspection mechanism, 
tailored traffic flow analysis, and unique packet tampering 
detection, IDS technology developed specifically for SCADA 
environments can be deployed with confidence in detecting 
malicious activity. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Traditional information technology (IT) measures of 
monitoring and securing Supervisory, Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) and Control System networks 
perimeters have used Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
appliances or software that examine traffic on the network 
and wait for events to occur. Current IDSs rely on signatures 
and anomaly detection to find malicious packets, scanning 
attempts, and denial-of-service, and man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) attacks. These systems are a good start for securing 
a SCADA network; however, another degree of granularity 
is required to understand how the systems operate and how 
to protect them and the infrastructure they operate. This 
paper describes common IDS technologies, where they 
work and where they need to be improved, to cover this new 
vulnerable SCADA environment. 
2. CURRENT TECHNOLOGY
Two broad type of intrusion detection technology are 
deployed today: those that detect anomalies in the network 
and those that match signatures.  Anomaly-based IDSs 
usually fall into three separate categories: behavioral, traffic 
pattern and protocol [1].  These systems classify network 
activity as either normal or anomalous and rely heavily on 
heuristics to make a determination on the traffic's intent. A 
signature-based IDS can only detect malicious traffic or 
network misuse if a signature has been explicitly created for 
detection. Signature-based IDSs rely on a series of patterns 
that malicious traffic may or may not match. When a 
signature- or anomaly-based IDS discovers a match or 
classifies a piece of network traffic as suspicious, alerts are 
generated and sent to either a central logging facility or 
logged into a file locally. This approach to securing 
networks works very well for popular network protocols 
when used in common IT infrastructure. Malicious 
operating system attacks, web exploitation, and virus-laden 
packets are detected easily and quickly with current IDS 
technology. 
Vendors have recognized a gap in the applicability of IDS 
technology to control system environments, and have started 
to create additional modules for their products targeted at 
the common protocols used in SCADA and control system 
protocols including Modbus®, DNP3 (Distributed Network 
Protocol), and Inter-Control Center Communications 
Protocol (ICCP) [2].  While these additions represent 
progress, these IDS products still lack the SCADA protocols 
found at the innermost networks segments—the protocols 
that make the system function [3]. Handling these protocols 
presents a larger challenge, as they are proprietary and are 
often undocumented or ported from insecure serial protocols 
to an Internet protocol (IP) network stack.  
Signature- and anomaly-based IDS technology was 
originally developed for the IT realm. The techniques 
applied in that environment have been slowly migrated to 
SCADA networks. These methods work to an extent but 
cannot reliably detect a sophisticated attacker. Current 
anomaly-based IDSs use heuristics to ensure traffic 
conforms to a known baseline. [4] This method works well 
if a well-defined baseline is generated. IDS technology 
based on a signature matching has its own strengths and 
weaknesses also. It can detect suspect or malicious packets, 
but is limited by the signatures defined. Current IDS 
technologies have a chance at detecting anomalous activity 
(network scans, malformed packets, operating system-level 
attacks), but the lack of authentication in the SCADA 
environments means there is nothing to stop an attacker 
from forging real and correct commands or data feeds. This 
method can be used to confuse a system or leave it in a 
critical state without employing those attack techniques that 
IT-driven IDSs were developed to detect. 
3. FUTURE SCADA IDS TECHNOLOGY
To leverage existing intrusion detection technology for 
successful deployment into a SCADA network a next 
generation IDS must adhere to three simple principles;  
• Able to match signatures and map specific network 
traffic. 
• Monitor traffic and generate flow analysis on each 
link while understanding the protocols used. 
• Evaluate traffic inconsistencies in session traffic 
and determine if that traffic has changed from the 
last time it was sampled. 
Many of these environments have legacy systems integrated 
into them that cannot be upgraded, patched, or protected by 
traditional IT means.  These points are critical to protecting 
systems that rarely use encryption, authentication, or bounds 
checking integrated into the network communication.  It is 
possible to build a SCADA specific IDS to meet these goals. 
4. SIGNATURE MATCHING
Signature- and anomaly-based IDSs use deep packet 
inspection to look inside the application layer of most IT-
centric protocols to verify the data is within normal bounds 
and not malicious. This includes malformed data packets, 
network scans, and command shell prompts returning from 
exploited machines. This technology needs to be extended 
in the SCADA world to look inside the protocols that make 
these systems work.  
Current SCADA protocols are usually undocumented, 
proprietary, and used primarily to move data and commands 
around the internal SCADA network. Before large network 
architectures were implemented into the SCADA 
environment, current protocols were sent over serial lines, 
modem lines, and any other point-to-point technology that 
was available. These protocols were developed to move data 
effectively, be processed quickly, and have minimum 
overhead on the already taxed processors of the time. 
Bounds checking and authentication were unnecessary 
extras not implemented within these simple protocols to 
improve efficiency.  
As large networks were rolled out, the older, point-to-point 
protocols were converted for use on packet switched 
networks by simply pre-pending transmission control 
protocol (TCP)/IP headers. This allowed the use of the 
legacy protocols on modern architectures and over greater 
distances. Traditional signature- and anomaly-based IDS 
implementations may be able to detect a malformed packet 
crafted by an unskilled attacker, but that packet is unlikely 
to result in a direct action on the SCADA network. Packets 
that are correctly formed and contain valid data within them 
or data that would overflow an internal buffer and have a 
direct effect are a larger concern. An IDS designed to 
understand SCADA protocols would be able to monitor for 
correct packets between hosts and alert on transactions that 
would be outside of a protocols bounds. Overflows or 
improperly formatted packets could result in exploitation of 
a network device. 
Using current deep packet inspection techniques to extract 
protocol state information would allow data including 
commands and point status to be interpreted and compared 
for improper format or data outside designated bounds. This 
type of detection is particularly effective against an attacker 
that is fuzzing a SCADA protocol in order to gain more 
knowledge while exploiting the system. Fuzzing the 
protocol, or sequentially testing fields within the protocol, 
can result in crashes and overflows from poor bounds 
checking and data handling of the older protocols. Figure  1 
shows an example of a normal packet that consists of a 
header, message type and a message length. Data follows 
the length field and a correct packet never has length over a 
specific size so as to not overflow an internal static buffer 
inside the receiving application or device. The incorrect 
packet looks like a legitimate data packet; however the 
length is well beyond the length for a correct packet. If this 
packet were sent, the internal static buffer would be 
overwritten outside the normal bounds and a classic 
overflow condition is exploited. An IDS looking at layer 4 
and higher of the network stack for correct field lengths 
within the packet would catch fields potentially exceeding 
the static buffer length, alerting to potential buffer overflows 
within packet. 
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Figure 1 - Typical protocol overflow condition 
5. NETWORK TRAFFIC FLOW ANALYSIS
IDSs in a SCADA network have at least one advantage over 
IDSs deployed in the corporate environment. SCADA 
networks are static, both in the sense of network topology 
and the tasks performed on the network. Servers and 
networking hardware are infrequently added to a system 
once it goes live; they also serve one single purpose, which 
is running SCADA software. Therefore it is possible within 
a SCADA network to map out all of the network traffic 
flows. This network map would contain information about 
which hosts talk to each other, which includes the ports, 
protocol (TCP or User Datagram Protocol [UDP]), and the 
host that initiated the connection. This information can then 
be programmed into an IDS that will watch the traffic flows 
of the SCADA network and trigger an alert on any traffic 
flows that do not match the normal traffic patterns.  
An example of a simple SCADA network is shown in 
Figure 2, and the corresponding rules are found in Table 1. 
Each valid connection, shown in black, has an entry in the 
IDS that allows the connection to occur without triggering 
an alarm. The invalid connections, shown in red, will be 
collected in the default rule that will trigger an alert. In the 
normal course of operation, a Human Machine Interface 
(HMI) or an operator console should have no reason to 
connect to the front end processor (FEP). In this scenario, 
such a connection would cause the flow-based IDS to send 
out an alert. 
Figure 2 - Typical SCADA Network 
Table 1 - Sample Traffic Flow IDS Configuration 
Source Destination Protocol Action 
Operator App Server HMI Allow 
Historian App Server Data API Allow 
ICCP Server App Server Data API Allow 
App Server FEP Control API Allow 
FEP RTU1, RTU2, 
RTU3 
DNPv3 Allow 
* * * Alert 
A flow-based IDS will catch any attacker that attempts to 
scan the network, no matter how slow or which obfuscation 
techniques are used. A network scan enumerates hosts and 
the network services running on the targets of the scan. 
Since rules are in place defining which hosts can 
communicate, scanning the network to discover hosts would 
trigger alerts as previously undefined connections are 
attempted as shown in Figure 3. When enumerating network 
services, a scan will attempt connections to ports not 
specifically defined, resulting in an alert from the IDS. For 
example, if an attacker forges an IP address, their forged IP 
address will not match one of the predefined rules and an 
alert will be generated by the IDS. 
Figure 3 - Attacker Scanning the Network 
In addition to detecting network scans, the traffic-based IDS 
will detect if a host tries to bypass parts of the system. For 
example, the FEP is a simple device that translates protocols 
and forwards commands onto remote devices. It will process 
and forward commands received from the application 
server, as well as any commands it may have received from 
the ICCP server. Because the ICCP server has no 
operational reason to talk directly to the FEP, the traffic-
based IDS will detect this otherwise valid action and trigger 
an alert. 
The configuration for the traffic-based IDS can be created 
by statically analyzing the hosts and the services running on 
them. It would also be possible to create these rules 
automatically by observing a correctly functioning system 
for a period of time and recording the traffic flows of a 
system in a normal state. This method is similar to anomaly-
based IDS, which uses a baseline for the network to detect 
anomaly activities. 
6. NETWORK DATA INCONSISTENCIES
The previous IDS strategies try to detect anomalous 
connections (Traffic Flow Analyzer) and malformed packets 
(Deep Packet Inspection) but will not detect man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks that can occur on a compromised 
server. Current IDS technologies will also miss detection of 
syntactically valid commands but are not correct or possibly 
malicious for the system. For example, if an attacker has 
compromised the FEP. From this location the attacker can 
send commands to the Remote Terminal Units (RTU) to 
carry out a malicious action. All of the commands 
transmitted by the attacker are syntactically valid, but are 
probably incorrect for the current state of the system. A 
traffic flow analyzer would have a rule to allow it, and the 
deep packet inspector would see that the command is 
formatted correctly; however, there is still the question of 
whether or not the command is valid. 
It should be possible to answer this question and detect 
many of these MITM attacks by building a real-time 
database of the points and commands transmitted on each 
network stream. By comparing these databases, it should be 
possible to detect the inconsistencies that a MITM attack 
would create. 
SCADA networks are regimented in how point data, data 
from remote hosts, and commands are distributed 
throughout the network. The point data is collected from the 
remote devices and is funneled through the FEP. The FEP 
translates the point address, optionally performs a scaling 
operation on the data, and forwards the resulting point data 
to the application server. The application server stores the 
point data in a real-time database. The data is then provided 
to its clients, such as the operator consoles (HMI), data 
historians, and ICCP servers. Operator commands are 
processed in the reverse manner. When initiated by the 
operator, a command flows from the operator’s computer to 
the application server. The application server then forwards 
the commands to the FEP, which forwards the commands to 
the RTU. In addition, the application server can send 
commands on its own, based on its own internal logic and 
state machine. 
As a consequence of the SCADA architecture the 
commands and data in the system exist in multiple locations 
at nearly the same time. In the simplest case, data travels 
from the RTUs, to the FEP, and onto the application server. 
It is then sent out to the operators, the ICCP server, and to 
the historian. This provides at least 5 copies of the data. By 
watching the traffic streams and building a per-network 
stream database of point data and commands, it would be 
possible to compare the data and watch for inconsistencies 
that will show up in the data streams when an active MITM 
attack occurs or if an unauthorized command is sent by a 
host that does not have the authorization to generate 
commands on their own. 
For example, if an attacker managed to compromise the 
FEP, he would be able to send commands to the remote 
devices independent of the application server and would be 
able to forge point data returning back to the application 
server to cover his or her tracks and blind the operators, as 
shown in Figure 4. In this example the compromised FEP 
sends a command to RTU2 to open a breaker (Bk1). Being a 
simple device, the RTU will trust that the command is 
legitimate and will then open Bk1 before sending back a 
status update indicating that Bk1 is open. The attacker can 
either drop this status update or forge a status update to the 
application server reporting that Bk1 is closed. There are 
two data inconsistencies that appear in this scenario. First 
the FEP sent a command to RTU2 to open Bk1 without a 
corresponding command from the application server. FEPs 
are not intelligent devices and should never be used to send 
a command without receiving a corresponding command 
from the application server. The second inconsistency shows 
up when the attacker either drops the status update or forges 
the status update to the application server. With a per-
network- stream database, it should be able to detect both of 
these inconsistencies and generate an alert.  
Figure 4 - Compromised FEP Sending Rouge Commands 
An attacker with control over the FEP could also filter 
incoming commands and drop commands that might 
interfere with his or her attack, as shown in Figure 5. In this 
case the attacker dropped the command to open Bk1 on 
RTU2. Because the RTU2 never got the command to open 
Bk1, its status update will always say that Bk1 is closed. In 
order to complete the illusion, the attacker must also forge 
status updates to the application server indicating that Bk1 
was indeed opened. This again creates two data 
inconsistencies that can be detected by maintaining and 
comparing per-network-stream databases. The First 
inconsistency is that the application server sends the FEP a 
command to open Bk1. The FEP does not have the 
intelligence to make a decision and drop the command, so 
the fact that the command shows up in the network stream 
from the application server to the FEP but not in the 
network stream from the FEP to the RTU2 indicates that 
something is wrong and may indicate a MITM attack. The 
second inconsistency is the point value on the network 
stream between the FEP and RTU2, which shows that the 
breaker is closed, and between the FEP and the application 
server, which shows that the breaker is open. Either of these 
inconsistencies can indicate the presence of an attacker 
performing a MITM attack and can be detected by 
comparing the databases for each network stream. 
Figure 5 - Compromised FEP Droppings Commands 
If an attacker has compromised the application server, 
detecting a MITM is not as simple as watching for 
inconsistencies in commands. The application server is 
intelligent and can initiate independent actions, and it can 
also drop commands from the operator that are deemed to 
be incorrect or could cause an unsafe condition. In the case 
of a compromised application server, the anomaly tracking 
IDS would rely on point-data inconsistencies rather than 
watching commands. For example, if the attacker decided to 
open Bk1 on RTU2, as shown in Figure 6, he would send a 
command to the FEP to open Bk1; the FEP, being a simple 
translator and forwarding device, will forward that 
command to RTU2. RTU2 will respond saying that Bk1 is 
now open, and the FEP will relay the corresponding status 
update to the application server. The attacker, wishing to 
cloak his or her actions, will then mutate the data and report 
to any consumers of the data, such as the operator and 
historians, that Bk1 is still closed. In this example there are 
four network streams: FEP to RTU2, application server to 
FEP, operator to application server, and historian to 
application server. Two of the four network streams have the 
correct status value for Bk1, which is FEP to RTU2 and 
application server to FEP, and the other two network 
streams have the incorrect status value for Bk1. This leads 
to a network data inconsistency that can be detected. 
Figure 6 - Compromised Application Server Falsifying 
Information 
The previous examples all dealt with host-based MITM 
attacks, where an attacker had compromised a host and used 
that host’s network privileges. This was performed in 
accordance with the assumption that the traffic flow-based 
IDS would be able to detect most network-based MITM 
attacks. Even if it cannot detect the attack, the network data 
inconsistency IDS would still be able to detect 
inconsistencies that appear in a network-based MITM. This 
is shown in Figure 7, which is an example of how an 
attacker compromises the FEP and dropping commands. 
The same inconsistencies will show up. The only difference 
is that there is an extra network stream; thus, there would be 
three databases to look at instead of two. 
Figure 7 - Network MITM Attack 
7. CONCLUSIONS
Current IDS sensors have difficulty working within a 
SCADA environment due to the lack of protocol 
understanding, which a traditional IDS would use to identify 
malicious network traffic. To address the legacy, proprietary 
traffic, newer and more granular methods that leverage the 
static nature of the network need to be developed to protect 
these critical, unsecured environments. A system 
implementing signature matching, flow analysis, and data 
inconsistency detection tuned specifically for SCADA and 
process control environment should be developed. 
Tuned signature matching on the protocol can detect fuzzing 
and potential exploitation vectors not addressed in current 
IDSs. Analyzing the data and command flows within a 
SCADA network can be used to detect unauthorized 
commands or MITM attacks between devices. While each 
detection methodology has its own strengths and 
weaknesses in protecting the network, a hybrid approach is 
able to cover the gambit of common attacks against a 
SCADA system.  
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